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Abstract
According to the Symantec and F-Secure threat re-
ports, mobile malware development in 2013 and 2014
has continued to focus almost exclusively (∼99%) on
the Android platform. Malware writers are applying
stealthy mutations (obfuscations) to create malware
variants, thwarting detection by signature based de-
tectors. In addition, the plethora of more sophisti-
cated detectors making use of static analysis tech-
niques to detect such variants operate only at the
bytecode level, meaning that malware embedded in
native code goes undetected. A recent study shows
that 86% of the most popular Android applications
contain native code, making this a plausible threat.
This paper proposes DroidNative, an Android mal-
ware detector that uses specific control flow patterns
to reduce the effect of obfuscations, provides automa-
tion and platform independence, and as far as we
know is the first system that operates at the An-
droid native code level, allowing it to detect malware
embedded in both native code and bytecode. When
tested with traditional malware variants it achieves a
detection rate (DR) of 99.48%, compared to academic
and commercial tools’ DRs that range from 8.33% –
93.22%. When tested with a dataset of 2240 samples
DroidNative achieves a DR of 99.16%, a false positive
rate of 1.3% and an average detection time of 26.87
sec/sample.
Keywords End point security, Android native
code, Malware Analysis, Malware variants detection,
Control flow analysis, Data mining
1 Introduction
Worldwide losses due to malware attacks and phish-
ing between July 2011 and July 2012 were $110 billion
[5]. In 2013 there was a 42% increase in the malware
attacks over 2011. Web-based attacks increased by
30 percent in 2012 [5]. Mobile malware development
in 2013 [6] and in 2014 [7] continues to focus almost
exclusively (∼99%) on the Android platform, due to
its popularity and open-nature.
In recent years there has been a significant amount
of research focusing on detection of Android malware
through both static [20, 27, 30, 35, 41, 45, 47, 49, 50]
and dynamic [15, 23, 35, 48, 52, 54] analysis tech-
niques. Among the static analysis techniques, all the
systems operate at the Java bytecode level. This is
logical, as most Android applications are primarily
written in Java. Many Android applications, how-
ever, contain functionality not implemented in Java
but instead in native code.
In this paper, we refer to native code as machine
code that is directly executed by a processor; as op-
posed to bytecode, which is executed in a virtual ma-
chine such as the JVM or Dalvik-VM. While the stan-
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dard programming model for Android applications is
to write the application in Java and distribute the
bytecode, the model also allows for developers to in-
clude native code binaries as part of their applica-
tions. This is frequently done in order to make use of
a legacy library or to write code that is hardware de-
pendent, such as for a game graphics engine or video
player.
A recent study [46] shows that 86% of the most
popular Android applications contain native code.
Given that existing, static analysis based malware
detection systems operate on a bytecode level, this
means these applications cannot be completely ana-
lyzed. If the malicious payload of the app was in-
cluded in the native code, existing systems would be
unable to detect it.
In addition to native code, another issue plagu-
ing malware detection on Android is obfuscation. To
protect an Android application for reverse engineer-
ing attacks, even legitimate developers are encour-
aged to obfuscate [19] their code. Similar techniques
are used by an Android malware writer to prevent
analysis and detection. Obfuscation can be used to
make the code more difficult to analyze, or to create
variants of the same malware in order to evade detec-
tion. Previous studies [26, 37, 51] have evaluated the
resilience of commercial anti-malware products when
tested against variants of known malware. In [37], the
authors found that none of the products were able to
detect the variants. In more recent work [51] the de-
tection rate of the products ranged from 50.95% –
76.67%.
In order to try and detect malware variants, sev-
eral works have focused on Android malware de-
tection using static analysis. Some of these, such
as [50] and [20], use API call graphs (ACGs); [47]
uses component-based ACGs; [27] uses byte se-
quence features. Other previous works have focused
on graphs to represent program semantics, such as
control-flow graphs [18] and data dependency graphs
[28, 31]. These techniques make an exact match
against manually-crafted specifications for malware
detection, and therefore can potentially be evaded by
malware variants. Other semantic-based techniques
are compute intensive, on reducing the processing
time [33] they produce poor detection rates (DRs)
and are not suitable for real-time malware detection.
This paper introduces DroidNative, a malware de-
tection system for Android that operates at the na-
tive code level and is able to detect malware in ei-
ther bytecode or native code. DroidNative performs
static analysis of the native code and focuses on pat-
terns in the control flow that are not significantly im-
pacted by obfuscations. This allows DroidNative to
effectively detect Android malware, even with obfus-
cations applied and even if the malicious payload is
embedded in native code. DroidNative is not lim-
ited to only analyzing native code, it is also able
to analyze bytecode by making use of the Android
runtime (ART) [1] to compile bytecode into native
code suitable for analysis. The use of control flow
with patterns enables DroidNative to detect smaller
size malware, which allows DroidNative to reduce the
size of a signature for optimizing the detection time
without reducing the DR. Our experimental analysis
shows that DroidNative is able to achieve an over-
all DR of 99.16% and a false positive rate (FPR)
of 1.3%. DroidNative achieves an average detection
time of 26.87 sec/sample when tested with 2240 sam-
ples, and is ∼6.5 times faster than the other compared
work [50].
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• DroidNative, as far as we know, is the first system
that builds and designs cross-platform signatures
for Android and operates at the native code level,
allowing it to detect malware embedded in either
bytecode or native code.
• When applied to traditional, bytecode based An-
droid malware, the detection rate is on par with
that of many research systems that only operate
at the bytecode level.
• When tested with previously unseen variants of ex-
isting malware, the detection rate is 99.48%, sig-
nificantly surpassing that of commercial tools.
• Based on our analysis of related work, DroidNative
is noticeably faster than existing systems, making
it suitable for real-time analysis.
• We provide n-fold cross validation results for the
system, providing a more systematic approach to
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demonstrating accuracy than is employed by most
similar works.
2 Background
DroidNative detects malware by building control flow
(behavioral) signatures of an application and com-
paring them to signatures derived from known mal-
ware. In order to build these signatures, the Android
program executable (provided in either bytecode or
native code) is converted to an intermediate repre-
sentation. This intermediate representation provides
automation, platform independence and reduces the
effect of obfuscations.
In this section we provide background informa-
tion regarding the intermediate representation used
as well as the Android Runtime Environment (ART)
that are used in the design and implementation of
DroidNative.
2.1 Malware Analysis Intermediate
Language (MAIL)
DroidNative performs its analysis on an intermedi-
ate representation of an Android application’s binary
code. In order to accomplish this, DroidNative makes
use of the Malware Analysis Intermediate Language
(MAIL) [10]. Traditionally, intermediate languages
are used in compilers to translate the source code into
a form that is easy to optimize and to provide porta-
bility. We can apply these same concepts to malware
analysis and detection. MAIL provides a high level
representation of the disassembled binary program
including specific information such as control flow in-
formation, function/API calls and patterns etc. Hav-
ing this information available in an IL allows for eas-
ier and optimized analysis and detection of malware.
DroidNative uses MAIL to provide an abstract rep-
resentation of an assembly program, and that repre-
sentation is used for malware analysis and detection.
By translating native binaries compiled for different
platforms (Android supports ARM, x86 and MIPS
architectures) to MAIL, DroidNative achieves plat-
form independence, and uses MAIL Patterns to opti-
mize malware analysis and detection.
2.1.1 Patterns for Annotation
MAIL is used to annotate a CFG (control flow graph)
of a program using different patterns available in the
language. The purpose of these annotations is to as-
sign patterns to MAIL statements that can be used
later for pattern matching during malware detection,
that helps us detect smaller malware, and enables us
to reduce the size of a signature and the detection
time.
There are a total of eight basic statements (e.g, as-
signment, control and conditional, etc) in MAIL that
can be used to represent the structural and behav-
ioral information of an assembly program. There are
21 Patterns in the MAIL language, and every MAIL
statement can be tagged by one of these patterns.
A pattern represents the type of a MAIL statement
and can be used for easy comparison and matching of
MAIL programs. For example, an assignment state-
ment with a constant value and an assignment state-
ment without a constant value are two different pat-
terns. The details of the patterns can be found in
Table 1.
2.1.2 Signature Generation Techniques
To counter simple signature-based malware de-
tectors, malware will often use obfuscation tech-
niques [26, 37, 51] to obscure its host application and
make it difficult to understand, analyze and detect
the malware embedded in the code. In order to de-
tect malware protected by obfuscations, we apply two
signature generation techniques designed to counter
such approaches. MAIL Patterns are used to build
these signatures.
Annotated Control Flow Graph The first tech-
nique, Annotated Control Flow Graph (ACFG), an-
alyzes a control flow graph derived from an appli-
cation and then annotates it using MAIL patterns in
order to capture the control flow semantics of the pro-
gram. A complete formal definition of an ACFG and
its matching for malware detection is given in [12].
Annotating the CFG with MAIL statements allows
much smaller CFGs to be reliably analyzed and used
for malware detection than are traditionally used in
3
Pattern Description
ASSIGN An assignment statement, e.g. r0 = r0 + r1;
ASSIGN CONSTANT An assignment statement including a constant, e.g. r0 = r0 + 0x01;
CONTROL A control statement where the target of the jump is unknown, e.g. if (zf == 1) JMP [r0 + r1
+ 0x10];
CONTROL CONSTANT A control statement where the target of the jump is known. e.g. if (zf == 1) JMP 0x400567;
CALL A call statement where the target of the call is unknown, e.g. CALL r5;
CALL CONSTANT A call statement where the target of the call is known, e.g. CALL 0x603248;
FLAG A statement including a flag, e.g. cf = 1;
FLAG STACK A statement including flag register with stack, e.g. eflags = [sp = sp – 0x1];
HALT A halt statement, e.g. HALT;
JUMP A jump statement where the target of the jump is unknown, e.g. JMP [r0 + r5 + 0x10];
JUMP CONSTANT A jump statement where the target of the jump is known, e.g. JMP 0x680376
JUMP STACK A return jump, e.g. JMP [sp = sp – 0x8]
LIBCALL A library call, e.g. compare(r0,r5);
LIBCALL CONSTANT A library call including a constant, e.g. compare(r0,0x10);
LOCK A lock statement, e.g. lock;
STACK A stack statement, e.g. r0 = [sp = sp – 0x1];
STACK CONSTANT A stack statement including a constant, e.g. [sp = sp + 0x1] = 0x432516;
TEST A test statement, e.g. r0 and r5;
TEST CONSTANT A test statement including a constant, e.g. r0 and 0x10;
UNKNOWN Any unknown assembly instruction that cannot be translated.
NOTDEFINED The default pattern, e.g. all the new statements when created are assigned this default value.
Table 1: Patterns used in MAIL. r0, r1, r5 are the general purpose registers, zf and cf are the zero and carry flags respectively,
and sp is the stack pointer.
CFG based techniques. The advantage of this is that
an application can be broken up into a collection of
smaller ACFGs instead of one, large CFG. This col-
lection can then be analyzed and pattern matched
with malware much more quickly than the larger
CFG.
For example, an application being analyzed is bro-
ken up into a set of small ACFGs which become
that application’s signature. At detection time, the
ACFGs within that signature are compared to the
ACFGs of known malware, and if a high percentage
of ACFGs in the application match that of known
malware, then the application can be flagged as mal-
ware. This matching is also very fast, because the
individual ACFGs being compared against are fairly
small.
Sliding Window of Difference The second tech-
nique for signature building, Sliding Window of Dif-
ference (SWOD) [11], is an opcode-based technique
for malware detection. One of the main advantages of
using opcodes for detecting malware is that detection
can be performed in real-time. However, the current
techniques [14, 36, 39, 42] using opcodes for malware
detection have several disadvantages: (1) The pat-
terns of opcodes can be changed by using a different
compiler, the same compiler with a different level of
optimizations, or if the code is compiled for a differ-
ent platform. (2) Obfuscations introduced by mal-
ware variants can change the opcode distributions.
(3) The execution time depends on the number of
features selected for mining in a program. Selecting
too many features results in a high detection rate but
also increases the execution time. Selecting too few
features has the opposite effect.
A SWOD is a window that represents differences
in MAIL patterns’ (while provide a high-level repre-
sentation of a program’s opcodes) distributions and
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hence makes the analysis independent of different
compilers, compiler optimizations, instruction set ar-
chitectures and operating systems. In order to miti-
gate the effect of obfuscations introduced by malware
variants, SWOD uses a control flow weight scheme
based on heuristics [11] to extract and analyze the
control flow semantics of the program. Furthermore,
it uses statistical analysis of MAIL patterns’ distri-
butions to develop a set of heuristics that help in se-
lecting an appropriate number of features and reduce
the runtime cost.
2.2 The ART Runtime Environment
Android applications are available in the form of
APKs (Android application packages). An APK file
contains the application code as Android bytecode
and precompiled native binaries (if present). Tra-
ditionally, those applications are executed on the
phone using a customized Java virtual machine called
Dalvik [2]. Dalvik employs just-in-time compilation
(JIT), similar to the standard JVM.
Starting from Android 5.0, the Dalvik-VM was re-
placed by the ART [1]. ART uses ahead of time
(AOT) compilation to transform the Android byte-
code into native binaries when the application is first
installed on the device. ART’s AOT compiler can
perform complex and advanced code optimizations
that are not possible in a virtual machine using a
JIT compiler. ART improves the overall execution
efficiency and reduces the power consumption of an
Android application, but increases the installation
time and may increase the code size of an applica-
tion. In this work, we use ART in order to translate
bytecode into native code that can be analyzed using
our techniques.
3 System Design
In this section we present the design of DroidNative.
DroidNative provides a fully automated approach to
malware detection based on analysis of the native
code of an Android application. It analyzes control-
flow patterns found in the code in order to compare
them to patterns seen in known malware.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the DroidNative
architecture. As mentioned previously, the system
operates by analyzing native code. The vast major-
ity of Android applications, however, are distributed
as bytecode. (For example, a standard application
might include the main application as Java bytecode,
but also include native code libraries for performance
reasons.) When an app is presented to DroidNative
for analysis, the application is separated into byte-
code and native code components. Any bytecode
components are passed to the ART compiler and a
native binary is produced. Any native code compo-
nents are passed directly to the next stage. At this
point, all parts of the application exist as native code.
Next, the binary code is disassembled and trans-
lated into MAIL code, which is processed using
ACFG and SWOD (more details can be found below)
in order to produce a behavioral signature. Next, the
similarity detector uses this signature and detects the
presence of malware in the application using the mal-
ware templates previously discovered during a train-
ing phase. A simple binary classifier (decision tree)
is used for this purpose. If the application being an-
alyzed matches a malware template (within a given
threshold), then the app is tagged as malware.
We will now discuss the various components of
DroidNative in more detail.
3.1 Disassembler
When provided with the native code for an applica-
tion, the first step in the DroidNative process is to
disassemble it. A challenge related to this stage is en-
suring that all code is found and disassembled. There
are two standard techniques [40] for disassembly. (1)
The Linear Sweep technique starts from the first byte
of the code and disassembles one instruction at a time
until the end. This assumes that the instructions are
stored adjacently, and hence does not distinguish be-
tween embedded data and instructions. When data
is mixed with the code either by the compiler or by
malware writers, this technique may produce incor-
rect results. The advantage of this technique is that it
provides complete coverage of the code. (2) The Re-
cursive Traversal technique decodes instructions by
following the control flow of the program. This tech-
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Figure 1: Overview of DroidNative.
nique only disassembles an instruction if it is refer-
enced by another instruction. The advantage of this
technique is that it distinguishes code from data. But
in case of a branch whose destination address cannot
be determined statically, this technique may fail to
find and disassemble valid instructions. To overcome
the deficiencies of linear sweep and recursive traversal
we combine these two techniques while disassembling.
For example, in case of an unknown branch, we use
MAIL to tag such address, and use a linear sweep to
move to the next instruction.
Another challenge related to this is that most bi-
naries used in Android are stripped, meaning they do
not include debugging or symbolic information. This
makes it extremely difficult to statically build a call
(API) graph for such binaries. It can also become dif-
ficult to find function boundaries. IDA Pro [3], the
most popular disassembler, uses pattern matching to
find such functions, but these patterns change from
one compiler to another and also from one version to
another version of the same compiler. Therefore, this
technique is difficult to maintain and is not general.
We handle this problem by building control flow pat-
terns and use them for malware detection. Our focus
is mostly on the detection of malware variants, there-
fore, we may only need to find where the control is
flowing (i.e: just the behavior and not the function
boundaries), and then compare this behavior with
the previous samples of malware available to detect
such malware.
3.2 Optimizer
The Optimizer performs normalization of the assem-
bly code. The normalizations performed are the re-
moval of NOP, junk and some of the prefixes. The
Optimizer also prepares the assembly code to be
translated to MAIL by removing other instructions
that are not required for malware analysis.
A key challenge for static analysis of native code
is the large number of instructions supported by the
Intel x86 and ARM microprocessors (the two most
popular architectures supported by Android). There
are hundreds of different instructions in instruction
sets for these architectures. In order to speedup static
analysis, we need to reduce the number of these in-
structions that we fully process. Many instructions
are not relevant to malware analysis. Examples in-
clude the instruction PREFETCH in Intel x86 and
PRFM in ARM. These instructions move data from
the memory to the cache. The optimizer removes
these and other similar instructions.
An Android application is divided into compo-
nents, and each component serves a different pur-
pose, and is called when an event occurs. In addi-
tion, exceptions permeate the control flow structure
of an Android app. Exceptions are resolved by dy-
namically locating the code specified by the program-
mer for handling the exception. This produces sev-
eral unknown branch addresses in a disassembled An-
droid binary program. The existence of multiple en-
try points makes it difficult to build a correct control
flow graph [8] for the program using static analysis.
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To handle this problem, DroidNative builds multi-
ple, smaller, interwoven CFGs for a program instead
of a single, large CFG. These smaller CFGs are then
used for matching and malware detection. Match-
ing smaller CFGs, instead of a single large CFG, also
helps in reducing the runtime.
3.3 MAIL Generation
The MAIL Generator translates an assembly pro-
gram to a MAIL program. Some of the major
tasks performed by this component are: (1) Trans-
lating each assembly instruction to the corresponding
MAIL statement(s). Some of the assembly instruc-
tions, such as PUSHA (x86) and STMDB (ARM),
are translated to more than one MAIL statement. (2)
Assigning a pattern to each MAIL statement. (3) Re-
ducing the number of different instructions by group-
ing together functionally equivalent assembly instruc-
tions so that the MAIL Generator can combine them
into one MAIL statement using the MAIL Patterns
listed in Table 1.
Further details regarding the transformation of In-
tel x86 and ARM assembly programs into MAIL can
be found in our technical report [9].
3.4 Malware Detection
In this Section we explain how the components, Data
Miner, Signature Generator and Similarity De-
tector, shown in Figure 1, use the two techniques,
ACFG and SWOD, for malware detection. The Data
Miner searches for the control and structural infor-
mation in a MAIL program to help the Signature
Generator build a behavioral signature (currently two
types of signatures, ACFG or SWOD) of the MAIL
program. The Similarity Detector matches the signa-
ture of the program against the signatures of the mal-
ware templates extracted during the training phase,
and determines whether the application is malware
based on thresholds that are computed empirically
as explained in Section 3.5, for malware detection.
entry
a
exit
b
c
d
e
entry
a
exit
b
d
c
e
hf g
ji
k m
Figure 2: An example of ACFG matching. The graph on the
left (M , a malware sample) is matched as a subgraph of the
graph on the right (Psg , the malware embedded inside a benign
program), i.e, M = (a, b, c, d, e) ∼= Psg = (b, c, e, h, j), where
M ∼= Psg denotes that M is isomorphic [29] to Psg .
3.4.1 DroidNative-ACFG
For detecting Android malware variants using
ACFGs, a CFG is built for each function in the an-
notated MAIL program, yielding the ACFGs. These
ACFGs, i.e, the signature of the Android program,
are matched against the malware templates to see
if the program contains malware or not. If a high
number of ACFGs within a program are flagged as
malware, then the application itself is flagged.
If a part of the control flow of a program contains
a malware, we classify that program as malware, i.e,
if a percentage (compared to some predefined thresh-
old) of the number of ACFGs in the signature of a
malware program match with the ACFGs in the sig-
nature of a program, then the program is classified
as malware. An example of ACFG matching can be
found in Fig. 2.
If an ACFG of a malware program matches with
an ACFG of a program, we further use the patterns
to match each statement in the matching nodes of
the two ACFGs. A successful match requires all the
statements in the matching nodes to have the same
patterns, although there could be differences in the
corresponding statement blocks. Example of a failed
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pattern matching of two isomorphic ACFGs is shown
in Figure 3. This allows us to detect malware with
smaller ACFGs, and also allows us to reduce the size
(number of blocks) of an ACFG for optimizing the
detection time. We reduce the number of blocks in
an ACFG by merging them together. Two blocks are
combined only if their merger does not change the
control flow of the program.
3.4.2 DroidNative-SWOD
Every MAIL statement is assigned a pattern dur-
ing translation from assembly language to MAIL.
Each MAIL pattern is assigned a weight based on the
SWOD that represents the differences between mal-
ware and benign samples’ MAIL patterns’ distribu-
tions. The CFWeight (control flow weight) of a MAIL
statement is computed by adding all the weights as-
signed to the elementary statements involved in it
using some heuristics. The final weight of a MAIL
statement is the sum of its CFWeight and the weight
of the pattern assigned to the statement. The fi-
nal weights of the statements of a MAIL program are
stored in a weight vector that represents the program
signature. This signature is then sorted in ascend-
ing order for easy and efficient comparison using an
index-based array.
After building the signature of a new program as
explained above, it is compared with the signatures of
all the training malware samples. In case of a match
with any of the signatures we tag the new program as
malware. An example of successful SWOD signature
matching can be found in Fig. 4, where 11 out of
16 (a threshold computed empirically) index-based
array values of the program match with the malware
program M15.
3.5 Malware Templates
The malware templates used for comparison are gen-
erated during a training phase that analyzes known
malware and extracts their signatures as explained in
Sections 2.1.2, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2. In this phase we find
the threshold to be used for ACFG matching, and
the differences between malware and benign samples’
MAIL patterns to find the SWOD values as described
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Figure 4: A successful SWOD signature matching.
in [11]. The threshold is the best similarity score of
ACFGs matching that achieves the highest DR for
the chosen dataset. The ACFG matching threshold
computed (using 25% of the dataset) for the dataset
used in this paper is 70%. The control flow weight
of each MAIL pattern is computed, which is then
used with the SWOD to compute the total weight
of each MAIL pattern. The computed threshold and
weight of each MAIL pattern are then used to build
the Malware Templates (malware signatures) shown
in Figure 1.
4 Evaluation
In order to analyze the correctness and efficiency of
DroidNative we performed a series of experiments of
the system, comparing it to existing commercial sys-
tems as well as research systems.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Dataset
Our dataset for the experiments consists of total 2240
Android applications. Of these, 1240 are Android
malware programs collected from two different re-
sources [34, 53] and the other 1000 are benign pro-
grams containing Android 5.0 system programs, li-
braries and standard applications.
Table 2 lists the class/family distribution of the
1240 malware samples. As can be seen, some of
the malware in our set is native code based while
8
908                  RSP = 0x8 - RSP;  (ASSIGN)
90c  [sp=sp+1] = 0x911; call (0xaec);  (CALL_C)
911  [sp=sp+1] = 0x916; jmp (0xb80);    (JMP_C)
916  jmp (0x180);                       (JMP_C)
91b  RSP = RSP + 0x8;                  (ASSIGN)
91f  jmp [sp=sp-0x1];                  (JUMP_S)
Block 0
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
129                  RAX = RAX + 0xf;  (ASSIGN)
12d  [sp=sp+1] = 0x132; call (0x4b8);  (CALL_C)
132  jmp (0xed6);                       (JMP_C)
136  jmp (0x068);                       (JMP_C)
13e                    EDI = EDI;      (ASSIGN)
140            [sp=sp+0x1] = EBP;       (STACK)
141                    EBP = ESP;      (ASSIGN)
143              EAX = [EBP+0x8];      (ASSIGN)
146                  EAX = [EAX];      (ASSIGN)
148   compare([EAX], 0xe06d7363);     (LIBCALL)
14e     if (ZF == 0) jmp (0x17a);   (CONTROL_C)
Block 0
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
=
=
=
=
         (a) One of the ACFGs of a malware sample                                   (b) One of the ACFGs of a benign program
Block 4
Figure 3: Example of a failed pattern matching of two isomorphic ACFGs. The ACFG on the left (a malware sample) is
isomorphic to the subgraph (blocks 0 – 3) of the ACFG on the right (a benign sample).
others are bytecode based. CarrierIQ is an adware
that performs keystroke logging, location tracking
and has the ability to intercept text messages. Droid-
Pak is an APK loader. It is a malware specifically
designed to infect Android devices. ChathookPtrace
performs malicious code injection. The 4 Droid-
KungFu variants make use of obfuscations to evade
detection, such as different ways of storing the com-
mand and control server addresses and change of class
names, etc. ADRD, DroidDream, DroidDreamLight
and BaseBridge also contain number of variants
through obfuscations. AnserverBot employs anti-
analysis techniques, such as, tampering of repack-
aged application; aggressively obfuscating its inter-
nal classes, methods and fields to make them hu-
manly unreadable; and detection of some of the anti-
malware programs. The samples collected from Con-
tagiominidump [34] consists of differrent latest mal-
ware applications, such as RansomCollection, Fake-
Mart, FakeJobOffer and FakeAntiVirus, etc.
In order to facilitate the possibility of other au-
thors comparing their systems to DroidNative, we
have made the source code (60,000+ lines of C/C++
code) of DroidNative and our testing dataset publicly
available [4].
4.1.2 Test Platform
All experiments were run on an Intel R© Xeon R© CPU
E5-2670 @ 2.60GHz with 128 GB of RAM, running
Ubuntu 14.04.1. Although such a powerful machine
is not required for running DroidNative, it was used
in order to speed the results of n-fold testing, which
requires a significant number of repetitions of exper-
iments. The ART compiler, cross build on the above
machine, was used to compile Android applications
(malware and benign) to native code.
4.2 N-Fold Cross Validation
We use n-fold cross validation to estimate the per-
formance of our technique. In n-fold cross validation
the dataset is divided randomly into n equal size sub-
sets. n−1 sets are used for training and the remaining
set is used for testing. The cross validation process is
then repeated n times with each of the n subsets used
exactly once for validation. This results in very sys-
tematic, accurate testing results for a given dataset
and removes the potential for skewed results based
on the choice of which data is used for training and
testing.
Before evaluating the proposed techniques, we first
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Class/Family Number of samples Code Type
CarrierIQ 8 ARM
DroidPak 5 Intel x86
ChathookPtrace 2 ARM
DroidKungFu1 35 Bytecode
DroidKungFu2 30 Bytecode
DroidKungFu3 310 Bytecode
DroidKungFu4 95 Bytecode
JSMSHider 15 Bytecode
ADRD 21 Bytecode
YZHC 22 Bytecode
DroidDream 16 Bytecode
GoldDream 45 Bytecode
DroidDreamLight 46 Bytecode
KMin 50 Bytecode
Geinimi 68 Bytecode
Pjapps 75 Bytecode
BaseBridge 122 Bytecode
AnserverBot 186 Bytecode
Contagiominidump 89 Bytecode
Table 2: Class distribution of the 1240 malware samples, in-
cluding whether they are native code or byte-code
define the following evaluation metrics:
• DR. The Detection Rate, also called the true posi-
tive rate, corresponds to the percentage of samples
correctly recognized as malware out of the total
malware dataset.
• FPR. The False Positive Rate corresponds to the
percentage of samples incorrectly recognized as
malware out of the total benign dataset.
• ROC. The Relative Operating Characteristic
curve is a graphical plot used to depict the per-
formance of a binary classifier. It is a two dimen-
sional plot, where DR is plotted on the Y-axis and
FPR is plotted on the X-axis, and hence depicts the
trade-offs between benefits (DR) and costs (FPR).
We want a higher DR and a lower FPR, so a point
in ROC space to the top left corner is desirable.
• AUC. The Area Under the ROC Curve is equal to
the probability that a detector/classifier will detect
a randomly chosen malware sample as malware and
a randomly chosen benign sample as benign. For
example, an AUC=1.0 means a perfect detector,
i.e, the detector will always detect correctly, and an
AUC=0.5 means the detector will detect correctly
half of the time.
Figure 5: ROC graph plots of DroidNative’s ACFG and SWOD
Through n-fold cross validation four experiments
were conducted using two different subsets of the
dataset. The first set consisted of 40 benign and
40 malware samples and the second set consisted of
350 benign and 330 malware samples. DroidNative-
ACFG and DroidNative-SWOD were each tested
with these two subsets of the dataset.
The ROC plot of both techniques using two
different cross-validations can be seen in Fig. 5.
DroidNative-ACFG produces better results than
DroidNative-SWOD. This difference is highlighted
by the AUC of the two techniques. The AUC of
DroidNative-ACFG range from 94.12 – 94.75 while
the AUC of DroidNative-SWOD range from 70.23 –
80.19.
4.3 Large-Scale Test
To make our technique lightweight and general, we
perform normalization of the binary code, as ex-
plained in Section 3, that helps improve our detec-
tion results, i.e, the DR and the runtime. We could
have used other binary analysis and optimization
techniques such as method (API) calls, number of
methods, loops and symbolic analysis etc. In gen-
eral, these techniques require control and data flow
analysis that are compute intensive and are not suit-
able for a real-time detector. Moreover, some of these
analysis may not be accurate or possible in general
to perform statically on machine code, as explained
in Section 3.
To further reduce the runtime, the current imple-
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mentation of DroidNative uses a simple binary de-
cision tree classifier, which has proven exceptionally
good for detecting malware variants. Currently the
classifier used in DroidNative is only using common-
alities among the malware samples. In the future we
will be carrying out a study to also find common-
alities among the benign samples, and between the
malware and benign samples. These commonalities
will be used to train the classifier that will help fur-
ther reduce DroidNative’s FPR.
In order to demonstrate the scalability of our ap-
proach we also performed an experiment with a larger
dataset of 2240 samples.
We trained DroidNative on 1000 malware samples
and then performed detection on a set of 240 malware
and 1000 benign samples. The results of this test
showed that DroidNative achieved a DR of 99.16%
and a FPR of 1.3%, with an average detection time
of 26.87 sec/sample. These results show that Droid-
Native is applicable to larger datasets.
4.4 Comparison with Commercial
Tools
In order to compare DroidNative to a variety of com-
mercial tools we generated variants of known mal-
ware in order to test their effectiveness. We se-
lected 30 different families (class/type) of Android
malware from [34], and used DroidChameleon [37]
to generate 210 malware variants based on them.
DroidChameleon applies the following 7 obfuscations:
NOP = no-operation insertion; CND = call indirec-
tion; FND = function indirection; RDI = removing
debug information; RVD = reversing order; RNF =
renaming fields; RNM = renaming methods.
In total, we generated 210 variants, but 18 of them
were not able to run on the new ART runtime. Droid-
Chameleon was implemented and tested using the
Dalvik-VM, and apparently some of the variants re-
sult in bytecode that is consider invalid by ART. As
such, we excluded these variants, leaving 192 sam-
ples.
We tested 16 commercial anti-malware programs
and DroidNative with these 192 Android malware
variants. For testing DroidNative we included only
the original 30 malware samples as the training
dataset and the other 192 variants and 20 benign
samples as the testing dataset. DroidNative was able
to properly classify all benign samples and 191 out of
192 malware samples. This is an overall DR = 99.48%
and FPR = 0%. The DR of DroidNative reported
here is the combination of both DroidNative-ACFG
and DroidNative-SWOD, i.e, the malware samples
detected by both.
Overall, only one malware variant sample was not
detected by DroidNative, and it belonged to class
RVD. This class/obfuscation inserts goto instruc-
tions that changes the CFG of a method/program.
After further analysis of the original and the variant
malware samples we notice that the difference (the
number of blocks and the control flow change per
ACFG) in ACFGs of the two samples was more than
50%. As we discuss later in Section 4.6, DroidNa-
tive may not be able to detect a malware employing
excessive control flow obfuscations. Therefore, Droid-
Native was not able to detect this variant as a copy
of the original malware sample.
We then tested a variety of commercial anti-
malware systems with the same 192 variants. The
results can be found in Table 3. The majority
(11/16) of the commercial anti-malware tools per-
formed very poorly, with overall DRs ranging from
8.33% – 72.91%. Five of the tools performed sig-
nificantly better, but were still not able to match
the results of DroidNative. Overall, the commer-
cial tools did better in our test than in previous re-
ports [26, 37, 51], which shows that their detection
techniques are continuously being improved.
4.5 Comparison with Existing Re-
search
In this Section we compare three [20, 27, 50] state
of the art research efforts carried out in 2014 that
use machine learning for Android malware variant de-
tection. Very few works report the runtime of their
detector, and to compare the runtime of our detec-
tor we selected DroidSift [50]. We selected DroidLe-
gacy [20], because of their use of n-fold cross valida-
tion for evaluating the performance of their detector.
Like DroidNative, DroidSift and AndroSimilar [27]
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Anti-malware Detection Rate (%)
NOP CND FND RDI RVD RNF RNM Overall
DroidNative 100 100 100 100 96.43 100 100 99.48
Kaspersky 92.85 92.85 92 92.59 96.43 93.1 92.59 93.22
Sophos 92.85 92.85 92 85.18 96.43 93.1 92.59 92.18
AVG 78.57 85.71 92 92.59 78.57 93.1 92.59 87.5
BitDefender 85.71 92.58 84 85.18 85.71 86.2 85.18 86.45
DrWeb 85.71 53.57 84 85.18 89.28 79.31 85.18 80.31
ESET 89.28 53.57 88 88.88 17.85 89.65 85.18 72.91
Microsoft 39.28 75 32 33.33 32.14 34.48 33.33 40.1
VIPRE 17.85 57.14 16 14.81 14.28 13.79 14.81 21.35
Symantec 14.28 53.57 8 3.7 7.14 10.34 7.4 15.1
Qihoo-360 10.71 53.57 8 7.4 7.14 6.89 7.4 14.58
Fortinet 10.71 53.57 8 7.4 7.14 6.89 7.4 14.58
TrendMicro 3.57 53.57 4 7.4 3.57 3.57 3.7 11.45
McAfee 7.14 53.57 4 3.7 3.57 3.57 3.7 11.45
TotalDefense 7.14 53.57 0 0 0 0 0 8.85
Malwarebytes 3.57 53.57 0 0 0 0 0 8.33
Panda 3.57 53.57 0 0 0 0 0 8.33
Table 3: Detection results of the 16 commercial anti-malware programs and DroidNative tested with 192 variants of 30 malware
families.
Technique DR FPR Dataset size Runtime Android
benign/ per native
malware sample binary
DroidNative 99.16% 1.3% 1000 / 1240 26.87 sec 3
DroidSift [50] 93% 5.15% 2100 / 193 175.8 sec 7
DroidLegacy [20] 92.73% 20.83% 48 / 743 7 7
AndroSimilar [27] 76.48% 1.46% 21132 / 455 7 7
Table 4: Comparison with other malware detection techniques discussed in Section 5. Out of the 1240 malware samples, 1000
were used for training and 240 for testing.
also test their techniques on malware variants gener-
ated through obfuscations.
Table 4 gives a comparison of DroidNative with
these three approaches. For DroidSift, we have only
reported the DR of their malware variant detector,
because their anomaly detector does not provide au-
tomation of malware detection. In DroidLegacy the
same 48 applications were used in each of the 10-folds
(confirmed through e-mail by the authors). During
the n-fold testing performed in the paper there were
a total of 10 different benign applications that were
detected as malware, therefore, according to our com-
putation the actual FPR = 10/48 = 0.2083.
The application of DroidSift and AndroSimilar to
general malware and impartiality towards the testing
dataset is not validated through n-fold cross valida-
tion or other such testing approaches. Their testing
may also suffer from the possibility of data overfit-
ting. DroidLegacy needs a larger number of benign
samples (more than 48) than tested in the paper for
further validation. None of the other techniques can
analyze Android native binaries. Out of the three
techniques, only AndroSimilar has the potential to
be used in a real-time detector but has poor DR re-
sults. DroidNative, on the other hand, is automated,
fast, platform independent, and can analyze and de-
tect Android native code malware.
The techniques proposed in DroidSift and DroidLe-
gacy are very similar to DroidNative-ACFG. The dif-
ference is that DroidNative-ACFG captures control
flow with patterns of the Android application’s na-
tive binary code, whereas DroidSift and DroidLegacy
capture the API call graph from the Android applica-
tion’s bytecode, and may not be able to detect mal-
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ware applications that obfuscate by using fake API
calls, hiding API calls (e.g, using class loading to load
an API at runtime), inlining APIs (e.g, instead of
calling an external API, include the complete API
code inside the application), and reflection (i.e, cre-
ation of programmatic class instances and/or method
invocation using the literal strings, and a subsequent
encryption of the class/method name can make it im-
possible for any static analysis to recover the call).
In DroidSift, during training the malware graphs
that were common to the benign graphs are removed,
i.e, there can be malware applications whose API
calls are similar to the benign applications; hence
their technique may not detect such malware applica-
tions. The anomaly detector proposed in DroidSift is
based on the behavior of known benign applications.
Keeping track of benign applications is impractical
in real life, and also makes it more complex in terms
of resources (time and memory) required than the
technique proposed in this paper. Hence, DroidSift
is much less efficient than DroidNative from a perfor-
mance perspective. The concept used in DroidSift for
anomaly detection is similar to the use of Whitelists,
and will suffer from the same issues, such as diffi-
cultly to collect and delay between discovery and up-
dating. Our technique is based on the behavior of
known malware applications, hence is more practical
and lighter in terms of runtime. Unlike DroidNative,
however, their anomaly detector may be able to de-
tect zero-day malware.
DroidNative-SWOD is similar to AndroSimilar
[27], which is based on SDHash [38] and is most likely
to detect very similar objects, and that’s why it pro-
duces low DRs. DroidNative-SWOD is a trade off
between accuracy and efficiency, and detects similar
objects at a coarse level, therefore it produces high
DRs.
In terms of variant detection, DroidSift was tested
with 23 variants of DroidDream, only 1 family (listed
in Table 2) of malware, and achieved an overall DR =
100%. They used one of the obfuscations described
in [37] to generate these variants, but it’s not clear
what specific obfuscation was used. AndroSimilar
was tested with 1013 variants of 33 families (most of
them are listed in Table 2) of malware, and achieved
an overall DR = 80.65%. They used the following
4 obfuscations, method renaming, junk method inser-
tion, goto insertion and string encryption, to gener-
ate these variants. DroidNative is tested with 192
variants of 30 families of malware generated using 7
types of obfuscation, and achieved an overall DR =
99.84%.
In terms of performance, only DroidSift reported
runtime results. Although we acknowledge that it is
less than ideal to directly compare performance num-
bers of two different systems tested on completely
different hardware, the fact that DroidNative is ∼6.5
times faster is a stronger indicator of the system’s sig-
nificant performance advantage. More thorough per-
formance testing would require access to the source
code of the other systems, which was not available to
us.
4.6 Limitations
DroidNative has some limitations, discussed in this
section.
Like all static analysis techniques, DroidNative re-
quires that the application’s malicious code be avail-
able for static analysis. Techniques such as packing
(compressing and encrypting the code) and applica-
tions that download their malicious code upon initial
execution cannot be properly analyzed by the system.
DroidNative may not be able to detect true zero-
day malware. DroidNative excels at detecting vari-
ants of malware that has been previously seen, and
will only detect a zero-day malware if its control
structure is similar (upto a threshold) to an existing
malware sample in the saved/training database.
DroidNative may not be able to detect a malware
employing excessive control flow obfuscations. Exces-
sive here means changing the control flow of a pro-
gram beyond a certain percentage (threshold). In
general, such threshold is difficult to find, but is cal-
culated for each different dataset. These control flow
obfuscations can be: control flow flattening, obscur-
ing the control flow logic of a program by flatten-
ing the CFG; irreducible flow graphs, reducing these
flow graphs looses the original CFG; method inlin-
ing, replacing a method call by the entire method
body, which may increase the number of CFGs in the
program; branch function/code, obscuring the CFG
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by replacing the branches by the address of a func-
tion/code; and jump tables, artificial jump table or
jumps in the table are created to change the CFG.
The pattern matching of two ACFGs may fail if
the malware variant obfuscates a statement in a ba-
sic block in a way that changes its MAIL pattern.
DroidNative performs exact (100%) pattern match-
ing for two ACFGs to match. To improve DroidNa-
tive’s resilient to such obfuscations, in the future we
will use a threshold for pattern matching. We will
also investigate other pattern matching techniques,
such as a statement dependency graph or assigning
one pattern to multiple statements of different type
etc, to improve this resiliency.
5 Related Work
5.1 Native Code Analysis for Other
Platforms
There are several efforts for detecting malware na-
tive binaries for standard PCs. We briefly discuss
some of these techniques. We also discuss the use of
intermediate languages for detecting malware native
binaries.
In [44], a method is presented that uses model-
checking to detect malware variants. They build a
CFG of a binary program, which contains informa-
tion about the register and the memory location val-
ues at each control point of the program. Model-
checking is time consuming and can run out of mem-
ory. Times reported in the paper range from few
seconds (10 instructions) to over 250 seconds (10000
instructions). [24] presents a method that uses CFGs
for visualizing the control structure and representing
the semantic aspects of a program. They extend the
CFG with extracted API calls to have more informa-
tion about the executable program. [33] proposes a
technique that checks similarities of call graphs (se-
mantic signatures) to detect malware variants. Only
system calls are extracted from the binary to build
the call graph. The call graph is reduced to reduce
the processing time, but this also reduced the ac-
curacy of the detector. [32] uses value set analysis
(VSA) to detect malware variants. Value set anal-
ysis is a static analysis technique that keeps track
of the propagation and changes of values throughout
an executable. VSA is an expensive technique and
cannot be used for real-time malware detection.
These techniques are compute intensive, and at-
tempts to reduce the processing time tend to produce
poor DRs, cannot handle smaller size malware, and
are not suitable for real-time detection. Other tech-
niques [14, 36, 39, 42] that mostly use opcode-based
analysis for detecting malware variants have the po-
tential to be used for real-time malware detection,
but have several issues: The frequencies of opcodes
can change by using different compilers, compiler op-
timizations, architectures and operating systems; ob-
fuscations introduced can change the opcode distri-
butions; selecting too many features (patterns) for
detection results in a high detection rate but also in-
creases the runtime.
5.1.1 Intermediate Languages
REIL [21] is being used for manual malware analysis
and detection. Unhandled native instructions are re-
placed with NOP instructions which may introduce
inaccuracies in disassembling. Furthermore, REIL
does not translate FPU, MMX and SSE instruc-
tions, nor any privileged instructions, because these
instructions according to the authors are not yet be-
ing used to exploit security vulnerabilities. SAIL [17]
represents a CFG of the program under analysis. A
node in the CFG contains only a single SAIL instruc-
tion, which can make the number of nodes in the
CFG extremely large and therefore can make anal-
ysis excessively slow for larger binary programs. In
VINE [43], the final translated instructions have all
the side effects explicitly exposed as VINE instruc-
tions, that makes this approach general but also dif-
ficult to maintain platform independence and less ef-
ficient for specific security applications such as mal-
ware detection. CFGO-IL [13] simplifies transforma-
tion of a program in the x86 assembly language to a
CFG. By exposing all the side effects in an instruc-
tion, CFGO-IL faces the same problem as VINE-IL.
Furthermore, the size of a CFGO-IL program tends
to be much larger than the original assembly pro-
gram. WIRE [16] is a new intermediate language
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and like MAIL is specifically designed for malware
analysis. WIRE does not explicitly specify indirect
jumps, making malware detection more complicated.
Furthermore, the authors do not mention anything
about the side effects of the WIRE instructions, and
is not clear how the language is used to automate the
malware analysis and detection process.
In contrast to other languages: side-effects are
avoided in MAIL, making the language much simpler
and providing the basis for efficient malware detec-
tion; control flow with patterns in MAIL provide fur-
ther optimization and automation of malware detec-
tion; publicly available formal model and tool makes
MAIL easier to use.
5.2 Detection of Android Malware
Variants
Because of the popularity of Android devices, there
are several research efforts on malware detection for
Android. For a comprehensive survey of Android
malware detection techniques the reader is referred
to [25]. Here, we only discuss the three [20, 27, 50]
research efforts that are also used for comparison in
Section 4.5.
[50] detects unknown malware using anomaly de-
tection. They generate an API call graph and assign
weights based on the data dependency and frequency
of security related API calls. A graph of an applica-
tion is matched against a graph database of benign
applications, and if a matching graph is not found
then an anomaly is reported. These reports are then
sent to a human expert for verification. For known
malware, a signature is generated for each malware
sample using the similarity score of the graphs. A
classifier is used for signature detection, and is called
the malware variant detector.
In general, changing (obfuscating) control flow pat-
terns is more difficult (i.e, it needs a comprehensive
change in the program) than changing just API call
patterns of a program to evade detection. ACG based
techniques look for specific API call patterns (includ-
ing call sequences) in Android malware programs for
there detection, which may also be present in An-
droid benign applications that are protected against
reverse engineering attacks. These API call patterns
can be packing/unpacking, calling a remote server for
encryption/decryption, dynamic loading, and system
calls, etc. Moreover, sometimes, e.g, for stripped na-
tive binaries of Android, it becomes impossible to
build a correct ACG of a program.
[20] uses API call graph signatures and machine
learning to identify piggybacked applications. Piggy-
backing can be used to inject malicious code into a
benign application. First a signature is generated of
a benign application and then it is used to identify if
another application is a piggyback of this application
or not. The technique used has the same limitations
as discussed above about the detection schemes based
on API calls.
[27] is based on SDHash [38], a statistical approach
for selecting fingerprinting features. SDHash relies
on entropy estimates and an empirical study, and
is most likely to pick features unique to a data ob-
ject. Therefore the results in the paper have a better
false positive rate. Although the FPR reported in
[27] is low (1.46%), because of the SDHash technique
used, whose main goal is to detect very similar data
objects, the ability of detecting malware variants is
much lower than the technique proposed in this pa-
per.
5.3 App Analysis on iOS
One other effort [22] targets Apple’s iOS, and per-
forms static binary analysis by building a CFG from
the Objective-C binaries. The main goal of the work
is to detect privacy leaks and not malware analysis
and detection. They perform complex data flow anal-
ysis such as backward slicing and others which are
time consuming and are not suitable for real-time
malware detection. There are some differences be-
tween Android applications and Apple iOS applica-
tions, such as the use of C, C++ and Java in Android
and Objective-C in iOS, and the use of components in
Android and use of message passing in iOS, etc. Be-
cause of these differences, binary analysis of these ap-
plications have significant differences and challenges.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed DroidNative for the
detection of both bytecode and native code Android
malware variants. DroidNative uses control flow with
patterns, implements and adapts the two techniques
ACFG and SWOD to reduce the effect of obfusca-
tions; uses the language MAIL to provide automation
and platform independence; and has the potential to
be used for real-time malware detection. To the best
of our knowledge, none of the existing static analysis
techniques deal with the detection of Android native
code malware, and this is the first research effort to
detect such malware. Through n-fold cross validation
and other test evaluations, DroidNative shows supe-
rior results for the detection of Android native code
and malware variants compared to the other research
efforts and the commercial tools.
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